Government Transfers and Political Support

48 Pages Posted: 17 Feb 2009 Last revised: 4 Sep 2022

See all articles by Marco Manacorda

Marco Manacorda

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Queen Mary, University of London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Edward Miguel

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrea Vigorito

Universidad de la Republica (Uruguay) - Instituto de Economia - Facultad de Ciencias Economicas

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2009

Abstract

We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty cash transfer program, the Uruguayan PANES, on political support for the government that implemented it. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment eligibility score, we find that beneficiary households are 11 to 14 percentage points more likely to favor the current government relative to the previous government. Political support effects persist after the program ends. A calibration exercise indicates that these persistent impacts are consistent with a model of rational but poorly informed voters learning about politicians' redistributive preferences.

Suggested Citation

Manacorda, Marco and Manacorda, Marco and Miguel, Edward and Vigorito, Andrea, Government Transfers and Political Support (February 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14702, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1344684

Marco Manacorda

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Queen Mary, University of London

Mile End Road
London, London E1 4NS
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Edward Miguel (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Andrea Vigorito

Universidad de la Republica (Uruguay) - Instituto de Economia - Facultad de Ciencias Economicas ( email )

Joaquin Requena 1375
Montevideo 11200, 11200
Uruguay

HOME PAGE: http://www.iecon.ccee.edu.uy

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