Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records

43 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2009 Last revised: 8 Nov 2009

See all articles by Jordi Blanes i Vidal

Jordi Blanes i Vidal

London School of Economics

Mareike Nossol

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: October 2009

Abstract

We use a quasi-experimental research design to study the introduction of a relative performance evaluation without introducing relative performance pay. The setting is a fi rm in which workers are paid piece rates and where, at some point, management begins to reveal to workers their relative position in the distribution of pay and productivity. We find that merely providing this information leads to a large and permanent increase in productivity that is costless to the fi rm. Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that workers' incipient concerns about their relative standing are activated by information about how they are performing relative to others.

Keywords: Tournaments, Relative Concerns, Status Concerns, Relative Performance Evaluation

JEL Classification: J33, M12, M52, M54

Suggested Citation

Blanes i Vidal, Jordi and Nossol, Mareike, Tournaments Without Prizes: Evidence from Personnel Records (October 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1346472 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1346472

Jordi Blanes i Vidal (Contact Author)

London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
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+44 (0) 779 51 61 034 (Phone)

Mareike Nossol

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom