The Role of Mobility in Tax and Subsidy Competition
33 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2009
Date Written: February 2009
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition. Our primary result is that increasing 'relocation' mobility of firms leads to increasing 'net' tax revenues under fairly weak conditions. While enhanced relocation mobility intensifies tax competition, it weakens subsidy competition. The resulting fall in the governments' subsidy payments over-compensates the decline in tax revenues, leading to a rise in net tax revenues. We derive this conclusion in a model in which two governments are first engaged in subsidy competition and thereafter in tax competition, and firms locate and potentially relocate in response to the two political choices.
Keywords: tax competition, subsidy competition, capital and firm mobility, foreign direct investment
JEL Classification: H71, H87, F21, H25
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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