Does Governance Travel around the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors

72 Pages Posted: 24 Mar 2009 Last revised: 29 Oct 2018

See all articles by Reena Aggarwal

Reena Aggarwal

Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business ; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Isil Erel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 29, 2010

Abstract

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003-2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a crucial role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promote good corporate governance practices around the world.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38

Suggested Citation

Aggarwal, Reena and Erel, Isil and Ferreira, Miguel Almeida and Matos, Pedro, Does Governance Travel around the World? Evidence from Institutional Investors (May 29, 2010). Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-008, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 267/2018, Fourth Singapore International Conference on Finance 2010 Paper, AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1361143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361143

Reena Aggarwal (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business ( email )

3700 O Street, NW
Washington, DC 20057
United States
202-687-3784 (Phone)
202-687-0798 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://gufaculty360.georgetown.edu/s/contact/00336000014RhE9AAK/reena-aggarwal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Isil Erel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Miguel Almeida Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Carcavelos
Rua da Holanda, 1
Carcavelos, 2775-405
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
434 243 8998 (Phone)
434 924 0726 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty-research/directory/pedro-matos/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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