At the Discretion of Rogue Agents: How Automation Improves Women's Outcomes in Unemployment Insurance

Posted: 23 Mar 2009

See all articles by Jeffrey B. Wenger

Jeffrey B. Wenger

RAND Corporation; American University - School of Public Affairs

Vicky M. Wilkins

American University - School of Public Affairs

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

Automation curtails the discretion of street-level bureaucrats in several ways: bureaucrats have little control over the input of data by claimants, management has increased opportunities for monitoring, and given the possibility that clients will deal with multiple bureaucrats, coworkers can now identify “rogue” agents. Some clients of a bureaucracy may benefit from the introduction of automation when the agency is biased against them. We test this claim by examining the recent introduction of the telephone claims in state Unemployment Insurance offices. Using state-level panel data from 1992 to 2005, we estimate the effect of filing a claim via telephone rather than in person. If street-level bureaucrats in this agency used their discretion to disentitle and punish clients who they deem “undeserving” of the policy benefits, then the introduction of automation could increase unemployment insurance (UI) payments for clients. Indeed, we find that telephone claims filing increases the number of women receiving UI benefits while having no effect on men. We posit that this finding is due to the elimination of the bias women previously faced when they entered a UI office.

Suggested Citation

Wenger, Jeffrey B. and Wilkins, Vicky M., At the Discretion of Rogue Agents: How Automation Improves Women's Outcomes in Unemployment Insurance (April 2009). Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp. 313-333, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1365700 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum044

Jeffrey B. Wenger (Contact Author)

RAND Corporation ( email )

1776 Main Street
Santa Monica, CA
United States
310 393 0411 (Phone)

American University - School of Public Affairs ( email )

Washington, DC 20016
United States

Vicky M. Wilkins

American University - School of Public Affairs ( email )

Washington, DC 20016
United States

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