Patterns of Power: Bargaining and Incentives in Two-Person Games
17 Pages Posted: 6 Apr 2009
Date Written: 1984
Abstract
We introduce the concept of a strategic dictator and use it to analyze patterns of power in two-pperson games that arise naturally in bargaining, arbitration, and incentive problems, a strategic dictator is an agent who has the power to ensure that at Nash equilibrium outcome is his or her preferred outcome. but who may have to lie in order to do this. We discuss applications of our analysis to Stackelberg and Cournot Duopolists. to bargaining situations, and to the existence of appropriate incentive systems.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Heal, Geoffrey M. and Chichilnisky, Graciela, Patterns of Power: Bargaining and Incentives in Two-Person Games (1984). Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 23, 1984, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1370676
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