Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful
13 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2009
Date Written: April 2009
Abstract
We show that a minimum wage introduced in the presence of asymmetric information about worker productivities will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and symmetric information.
Keywords: minimum wages, unemployment, asymmetric information, labour market regulation
JEL Classification: J2, J3, H5, L5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Schöb, Ronnie and Schöb, Ronnie and Thum, Marcel, Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages Less Harmful (April 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2623, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1392169 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1392169
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