The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts
Brandeis Law Journal, Vol. 1, April 1999
Posted: 24 Feb 1999
Abstract
Under Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Congress cannot use Article I to authorize private actions against unconsenting States in federal court. Congress can still use Article I, however, to impose substantive obligations on the States, such as an obligation to pay their employees a minimum wage. The unresolved question is whether Congress can compel the state courts to hear private actions against their own State to enforce those obligations.
Professor Seamon argues that Congress cannot do so. He bases that conclusion primarily on the "anticommandeering principle" of the Tenth Amendment. He explains that the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, compels state courts to hear certain actions despite state law to the contrary. The Supremacy Clause, however, does not override neutral state laws of judicial administration, including neutral laws giving States immunity in their own courts. The anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from using Article I to require state courts to hear private actions that the Supremacy Clause would not, of its own force, require them to hear.
There are nonetheless limits on the States' immunity from private actions in their own courts. The Supremacy Clause requires a state court to hear a private, federal action against its own State if the court has power to hear state-law actions against the State that arise from the same facts. Moreover, the Due Process Clause empowers Congress to compel state courts to hear private actions directly against their own States under certain circumstances. Specifically, Congress can do so under the same circumstances as those under which it can abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.
Note: This is a description of the article and is not the actual abstract.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation