The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts

Brandeis Law Journal, Vol. 1, April 1999

Posted: 24 Feb 1999

Abstract

Under Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Congress cannot use Article I to authorize private actions against unconsenting States in federal court. Congress can still use Article I, however, to impose substantive obligations on the States, such as an obligation to pay their employees a minimum wage. The unresolved question is whether Congress can compel the state courts to hear private actions against their own State to enforce those obligations.

Professor Seamon argues that Congress cannot do so. He bases that conclusion primarily on the "anticommandeering principle" of the Tenth Amendment. He explains that the Supremacy Clause, of its own force, compels state courts to hear certain actions despite state law to the contrary. The Supremacy Clause, however, does not override neutral state laws of judicial administration, including neutral laws giving States immunity in their own courts. The anticommandeering principle prevents Congress from using Article I to require state courts to hear private actions that the Supremacy Clause would not, of its own force, require them to hear.

There are nonetheless limits on the States' immunity from private actions in their own courts. The Supremacy Clause requires a state court to hear a private, federal action against its own State if the court has power to hear state-law actions against the State that arise from the same facts. Moreover, the Due Process Clause empowers Congress to compel state courts to hear private actions directly against their own States under certain circumstances. Specifically, Congress can do so under the same circumstances as those under which it can abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court.

Note: This is a description of the article and is not the actual abstract.

Suggested Citation

Seamon, Richard Henry, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own Courts. Brandeis Law Journal, Vol. 1, April 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=139563

Richard Henry Seamon (Contact Author)

University of Idaho - College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 442321
Moscow, ID 83844
United States
208-885-7061 (Phone)

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