Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling
Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 52, p. 891, 2001
38 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2009
Date Written: June 3, 2009
Abstract
This article, published in 2001, argues that bundling of broadband transmission and Internet services by cable companies does not pose a sufficient risk of harm to innovation to justify a regulatory or antitrust requirement of open access.
Keywords: antitrust, cable, internet, bundling
JEL Classification: K21, K21, L12, L41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lopatka, John E. and Page, William Hepburn, Internet Regulation and Consumer Welfare: Innovation, Speculation, and Cable Bundling (June 3, 2009). Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 52, p. 891, 2001, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1413947
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.