Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality, and Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence from China

45 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2009

See all articles by Ferdinand A. Gul

Ferdinand A. Gul

Monash University Sunway Campus

Jeong-Bon Kim

Simon Fraser University; City University of Hong Kong

Aini Qiu

Citigroup Japan Inc.

Date Written: June 5, 2009

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of largest-shareholder ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the amount of firm-specific information incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity, of Chinese-listed firms over the 1996-2003 period. We show that synchronicity is a concave function of ownership by the largest shareholder with its maximum at an approximately 50% level. Further, we find that synchronicity is higher when the largest shareholder is government related. We also find that foreign ownership and auditor quality are inversely associated with synchronicity. Finally, we show that the amount of earnings information reflected in stock returns is lower for firms with high synchronicity.

Keywords: Ownership concentration, State ownership, Foreign ownership, Audit quality, Stock price synchronicity, China

JEL Classification: G14, G15, G24, G38

Suggested Citation

Gul, Ferdinand A. and Kim, Jeong-Bon and Qiu, Aini, Ownership Concentration, Foreign Shareholding, Audit Quality, and Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence from China (June 5, 2009). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1414811

Ferdinand A. Gul

Monash University Sunway Campus ( email )

Jalan Lagoon Selatan
Selangor Darul Ehsan
Bandar Sunway, 46150
Malaysia

Jeong-Bon Kim (Contact Author)

Simon Fraser University ( email )

8888 University Drive
Burnaby, British Colombia V5A 1S6
Canada

City University of Hong Kong ( email )

Department of Accountancy
83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon Tong
Hong Kong
852-3442-7909 (Phone)

Aini Qiu

Citigroup Japan Inc. ( email )

Japan

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