Private Import Safety Regulation and Transnational New Governance

25 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2009 Last revised: 24 Jun 2009

See all articles by Errol Meidinger

Errol Meidinger

University at Buffalo Law School; University of Freiburg

Date Written: June 9, 2009

Abstract

This paper examines the role of ‘private’ (non-governmental) regulatory programs in assuring the safety of imported products. Focusing particularly on food safety it argues that private regulatory institutions have great capacity to control safety hazards and to implement dynamic systems for detecting and correcting nascent risks. However, to establish the accountability and legitimacy relationships necessary for long-term effectiveness, private safety regulatory programs must devise new ways of incorporating and responding to the interests of developing country producers, laborers, consumers, and governments. Developed country regulators can aid this process by ‘orchestrating’ transnational governance processes to ensure that private regulatory programs collect and share information, maximize transparency and participation in their standard setting procedures, and experience incentives to deploy maximal care in implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, consumer protection, food safety, globalization, import regulation, import safety, international trade, market chain governance, new governance, private regulation, private standard setting, product safety, regulatory governance, safety regulation, supply chain

Suggested Citation

Meidinger, Errol, Private Import Safety Regulation and Transnational New Governance (June 9, 2009). Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2009-13, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1416758

Errol Meidinger (Contact Author)

University at Buffalo Law School ( email )

PO Box 288
Clinton, MT 59825-0288
United States
716-536-4521 (Phone)

University of Freiburg ( email )

Tennebacher Str. 4
Freiburg, 79106
Germany

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