Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule
Washington University, John M. Olin School of Business, Working Paper No. OLIN-98-07
Posted: 15 Feb 1999
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Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule
Abstract
Social and economic development requires some degree of stable policy making. The instability of group decision making under majority rule ahs preoccupied social theorists since Condorcet. In theory, subtle institutional modifications to pure majority rule should induce stability. This paper reviews experimental evidence regarding these stability inducing modifications. The experiments examine the impact of agenda control, super-majorities, veto powers, and bicameralism on group decision making.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
William P. Bottom (Contact Author)
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )
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Ronald R. King
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )
One Brookings Drive
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United States
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314-935-6359 (Fax)