Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3), 733-758

51 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2009 Last revised: 24 Apr 2015

See all articles by David Gill

David Gill

Purdue University, Department of Economics

Date Written: March 1, 2008

Abstract

We analyze the incentives to disclose intermediate research results during the course of a patent contest. Despite knowledge spillovers, the leading innovator sometimes discloses to signal commitment to the project, and so potentially inducing a rival’s exit. Surprisingly, when development costs are low the leading innovator does not need to disclose to induce the same strategic deterrence effect as that which arises from disclosure. Taking into account wasteful duplication of R&D effort, a patent office can increase welfare by choosing the probability of granting a contested patent and so altering the proportion of rivals that the leading innovator deters.

Keywords: Disclosure, Signalling, Intermediate Research Results, Intermediate Research, Multi-Step Research, Spillovers, R&D, Patent, Patent Office, Patent Policy, Patent Contest, Knowledge, Knowledge Spillovers, Information Spillovers, Information, Development Cost, Exit, Strategic Deterrence, Deterrence

JEL Classification: C72, D82, L19, O32

Suggested Citation

Gill, David, Strategic Disclosure of Intermediate Research Results (March 1, 2008). Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17(3), 733-758, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1423064 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1423064

David Gill (Contact Author)

Purdue University, Department of Economics ( email )

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

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