Causes and Consequences of a Father’s Child Leave: Evidence from a Reform of Leave Schemes

University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper Series 2009-8

33 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2009

See all articles by Helena Skyt Nielsen

Helena Skyt Nielsen

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: June 29, 2009

Abstract

Many OECD countries have implemented policies to induce couples to share parental leave. This paper investigates how responsive intra-household leave-sharing is to changes in economic incentives. To investigate this fundamental question, we are forced to look at one of the Nordic countries which are the most progressive when it comes to family-friendly policies. An extensive reform of child leave schemes in Denmark affected couples differently depending on whether the parents where employed in the same or in different parts of the public sector. Based on a difference-in-differences strategy, I find that economic incentives are very important for intra-household leave-sharing. Increasing the couples’ after tax income by $9 per day of leave which is transferred from the mother to the father is found to lead to a one day transfer. This corresponds to a supply elasticity close to unity.

Keywords: fathers, parental leave, child leave

JEL Classification: J13, J22, J45, J48

Suggested Citation

Nielsen, Helena Skyt, Causes and Consequences of a Father’s Child Leave: Evidence from a Reform of Leave Schemes (June 29, 2009). University of Aarhus Economics Working Paper Series 2009-8, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1427248 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1427248

Helena Skyt Nielsen (Contact Author)

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Alle 4
Aarhus, 8210
Denmark

HOME PAGE: http://person.au.dk/hnielsen@econ.au.dk

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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