A Competition Policy Lesson in Times of Crisis: State Aid Control by the European Commission (in Spanish)

III Jornadas Nacionales de Defensa de la Competencia, Valencia, June 19, 2009

14 Pages Posted: 7 Jul 2009 Last revised: 20 Sep 2010

Date Written: June 18, 2009

Abstract

The enforcement of State aid prohibition in the current economic crisis provides a good example of threats faced by competition policy. At first sight one may think that state aid control by the EC Commission could become an easy 'victim' of the economic crisis due to the current multiplication of Member States interventions in aid of domestic firms. However, that view is mistaken, the strategy developed by the EC Commission to face the threats and risks that the economic crisis have posed to the state aid prohibition and control is a good public policy model to follow. The EC Commission has remained loyal to the principles and rules that apply to State aid in the EU, coherently it has prohibited many Member State aids that squarely infringed the State aid prohibition of the EC Treaty. Moreover, respect to the principles inspiring state aid regulation in the EU (transparence, non discrimination, common interest, necessity and proportionality) has not been broken by the adoption of exceptional and provisional measures aimed at providing a sensible framework to accommodate Member States interventions directed to the banking sector to provide stability to financial and credit markets and to regain confidence. The strengthening of the EC Commission’s resources assigned to state aid control has greatly contributed in the task to secure a consistent, fast and effective functioning of the system in current times.

Keywords: state aid, competition, economic crisis

JEL Classification: H71, K21, L44

Suggested Citation

Marcos, Francisco, A Competition Policy Lesson in Times of Crisis: State Aid Control by the European Commission (in Spanish) (June 18, 2009). III Jornadas Nacionales de Defensa de la Competencia, Valencia, June 19, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1429792 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1429792

Francisco Marcos (Contact Author)

IE Law School ( email )

Castellón de la Plana 8
Madrid, Madrid 28006
Spain

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