Download This PaperFines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement
Cahiers de Recherche PRISM-Sorbonne Working Paper
38 Pages Posted: 9 Jul 2009 Last revised: 2 Sep 2009
Date Written: June 8, 2009
Abstract
Based on a sample of 64 cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1975 to 2009 and a methodology allowing to estimate restitution and dissuasive fines to be imposed on cartels from microeconomic variables on a case by case basis, this paper compares the level of fines actually inflicted to cartels participants to the illicit gain captured by the firms and estimates a range of restitution and dissuasive fines in each case. Our results show that fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission are overall sub optimal, whatever the level of the probability of detection.
Keywords: Cartels, Antitrust, Competition policy, European Commission
JEL Classification: L40, L41, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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