Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?

48 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2009

See all articles by Hans Jarle Kind

Hans Jarle Kind

Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration (NHH); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Tore Nilssen

University of Oslo - Department of Economics

Lars Sorgard

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2009

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like TV channels raise revenue. A media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or the readers, if we consider newspapers), or by both. We show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes. This implies that the less differentiated the media firms’ content, the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising. A media firm’s scope for raising revenues from ads, on the other hand, is constrained by how many competitors it faces. We should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products.

JEL Classification: D21

Suggested Citation

Kind, Hans Jarle and Nilssen, Tore and Sorgard, Lars, Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue? (July 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2713, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1437494 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1437494

Hans Jarle Kind (Contact Author)

Norwegian School of Economics & Business Administration (NHH) ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway
+47 55 583 890 (Phone)
+47 55 583 901 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Tore Nilssen

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

Lars Sorgard

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NHH) ( email )

Helleveien 30
Bergen, NO-5045
Norway
+47 5 595 9723 (Phone)
+47 5 595 9543 (Fax)

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

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