Minority Representation, the Supreme Court, and the Politics of Democracy

Abstract

This Article develops an alternative theoretical approach to the Supreme Court's controversial electoral redistricting decisions in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny. Instead of relying on the traditional equal protection interpretation, this Article argues that controversies over electoral redistricting, and the representation of minorities, are at base disputes among competing visions of democracy. In the Court’s redistricting cases, the majority and the dissent adopted fundamentally different visions of democracy — individualist democracy and democracy-as-power — which were tied to divergent views about the salience of race for democratic representation. In addition to elaborating these rival understandings of democracy, this Article also addresses a central paradox in the Supreme Court majority’s decision: its simultaneous denial and recognition of the relevance of racial groups in representation.

Keywords: constitutional law, minority representation, electoral redistricting, Shaw v. Reno, voting rights, Supreme Court, democratic theory