Government Checking Government: How Performance Measures Expand Distributive Politics

29 Pages Posted: 2 Aug 2009

See all articles by Anthony M. Bertelli

Anthony M. Bertelli

Pennsylvania State University; Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI

Peter John

University College London - School of Public Policy; Department of Political Economy, KCL

Date Written: July 30, 2009

Abstract

This paper argues that distributive politics operates in a variety of contexts in which governments seek to check the behavior of other governments. We provide a novel theoretical account of performance measurement systems as political discipline mechanisms even when measures are compiled by formally independent administrative agencies. We test the implications of our theory using a dataset of performance ratings in English local government assessed between 2002-2006. Results suggest that political influence favors swing voters, and local authorities sharing party affiliation with the incumbent central government are favored over those controlled by the opposition. Evidence further suggests that the independent rater in our empirical case is influenced through ties between its membership and the local authorities that it regulates. Our theoretical argument and findings have implications for many national and international contexts.

Keywords: Performance Measurement, Distributive Politics, Independent Agencies, British Politics

JEL Classification: H77, D73

Suggested Citation

Bertelli, Anthony M. and John, Peter and John, Peter, Government Checking Government: How Performance Measures Expand Distributive Politics (July 30, 2009). CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1441668 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441668

Anthony M. Bertelli (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University ( email )

University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://tonybertelli.com

Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals - IBEI ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Peter John

University College London - School of Public Policy ( email )

29/30 Tavistock Square
London, WC1H 9QU
United Kingdom

Department of Political Economy, KCL ( email )

Strand
London, England WC2R 2LS
United Kingdom