Team Formation in a Network
34 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2009
Date Written: August 4, 2009
Abstract
Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.
Keywords: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation, Imperfect Information
JEL Classification: C72, C73, D85
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset Prices
-
Social Interaction and Stock Market Participation
By Jeffrey D. Kubik, Harrison G. Hong, ...
-
Social Interaction and Stock-Market Participation
By Jeffrey D. Kubik, Harrison G. Hong, ...
-
Individual Investors and Local Bias
By Mark S. Seasholes and Ning Zhu
-
Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers
By Jeffrey D. Kubik, Harrison G. Hong, ...
-
The Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-of-Mouth Effects in the Holdings and Trade of Money Managers
By Jeffrey D. Kubik, Harrison G. Hong, ...
-
Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues' Choices
By Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
-
Participation and Investment Decisions in a Retirement Plan: The Influence of Colleagues' Choices
By Esther Duflo and Emmanuel Saez
-
The Local Bias of Individual Investors
By Ning Zhu