Words or Deeds? Choosing What to Know About Others
24 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009
Date Written: August 11, 2009
Abstract
Social cooperation often relies on individuals’ spontaneous norm obedience when there is no punishment for violation or reward for compliance. However, people do not consistently follow pro-social norms. Previous studies have suggested that an individual’s tendency toward norm conformity is affected by empirical information (i.e. what others did or would do in a similar situation) as well as by normative information (i.e. what others think one ought to do). Yet little is known about whether people have an intrinsic desire to obtain norm-revealing information. In this paper, we use a dictator game to investigate whether dictators actively seek norm-revealing information and, if so, whether they prefer to get empirical or normative information. Our data show that although the majority of dictators choose to view free information before making decisions, they are equally likely to choose empirical or normative information. However, a large majority (more than 80%) of dictators are not willing to incur even a very small cost for getting information. Our findings help to understand why norm compliance is context-dependent, and highlight the importance of making norm-revealing information salient in order to promote conformity.
Keywords: social norms, expectations, information, dictator games
JEL Classification: C91, D63, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Do the Right Thing: But Only If Others Do So
By Cristina Bicchieri and Erte Xiao
-
Social Comparisons in Ultimatum Bargaining
By Iris Bohnet and Richard J. Zeckhauser
-
The Focusing and Informational Effects of Norms on Pro-Social Behavior
By Erin L. Krupka and Roberto A. Weber
-
The Focusing and Informaitonal Effects of Norms on Pro-Social Behavior
By Erin L. Krupka and Roberto A. Weber
-
Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?
By Erin L. Krupka and Roberto A. Weber
-
Identifying Social Norms using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?
By Erin L. Krupka and Roberto A. Weber
-
Taxation and Conditional Cooperation
By Bruno S. Frey and Benno Torgler
-
Turning the Lab into Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon A Lab Experiment on the Transparency of Punishment
-
Peer Effects in Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms or Social Preferences?
By Simon Gaechter, Daniele Nosenzo, ...