German Participation in EU Decision‐Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures

Abstract

This article considers the effect of the Lisbon judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 30 June 2009 on the national legislature’s oversight and participation regarding EU decision-making. In particular, it compares German oversight, before and after the ruling, to systems of parliamentary scrutiny as they exist in other EU member states. It is argued that member states are allowed to constrain their governments domestically in EU matters, but that the ruling is unlikely to boost German oversight in comparative rankings beyond its current ‘moderate-to-strong’ position. Several national parliaments in the EU operate stricter forms of oversight already, compared with the German legislative chambers, and the political factors that generally influence parliamentary behaviour in Germany will not have suddenly changed. The ruling’s most remarkable practical effect is that it allows the opposition, should it control a blocking minority in the German Bundesrat, to veto the application of the flexibility clause, which is treated essentially on par with ordinary treaty amendment procedures.

Keywords: Lisbon Judgment, National parliaments, European Union, European scrutiny

JEL Classification: K00