The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set

Posted: 18 Aug 2009

See all articles by William Bianco

William Bianco

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael S. Lynch

University of Kansas

Gary J. Miller

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science

Itai Sened

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science

Abstract

The uncovered set has frequently been proposed as a solution concept for majority rule settings. This paper tests this proposition using a new technique for estimating uncovered sets and a series of experiments, including five-player computer-mediated experiments and 35-player paper-format experiments. The results support the theoretic appeal of the uncovered set. Outcomes overwhelmingly lie in or near the uncovered set. Furthermore, when preferences shift, outcomes track the uncovered set. Although outcomes tend to occur within the uncovered set, they are not necessarily stable; majority dominance relationships still produce instability, albeit constrained by the uncovered set.

Suggested Citation

Bianco, William and Lynch, Michael S. and Miller, Gary J. and Sened, Itai, The Constrained Instability of Majority Rule: Experiments on the Robustness of the Uncovered Set. Political Analysis, Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 115-137, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1448418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpm024

William Bianco (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Michael S. Lynch

University of Kansas ( email )

1415
Lawrence, KS 66045
United States

Gary J. Miller

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1063
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States
314-935-5874 (Phone)
314-935-5856 (Fax)

Itai Sened

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )

One Brookings Drive
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

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