Media (Non)Conformity to Executive Framing: The Conditions Under Which Media Transmit the President's Framing of Foreign Policy Crises
52 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2009 Last revised: 30 Sep 2009
Date Written: August 23, 2009
Abstract
Presidents have strong incentives to control how foreign policy issues are framed by the media and understood by the public. Yet the White House has little control over whether media pick up the President’s frame. In this paper, we examine the conditions under which the media adhere (and do not adhere) to executive framing of foreign policy crises in the case of the war on terror. We argue that the propensity for media outlets to broadcast the President’s portrayal of a crisis issue varies as a function of four key variables: 1) the type of frame the President uses, 2) real-world cues, 3) public opinion, and 4) time.
We test our hypotheses using data collected by content analyzing presidential papers, New York Times articles, and Wall Street Journal abstracts pertinent to the war (2001-2006) and then use time series and duration analyses to model media framing.
One thing we find is that, as time moves on, dominant media frames become increasingly susceptible to overhaul. Unless the President reframes the issue, the media will find new ways of framing it — often at the President’s expense. We believe these dynamics have important implications for the making, and selling, of foreign policy.
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