Criminal Constitutions

Global Crime, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 279-298, 2010

Posted: 20 Aug 2009 Last revised: 29 Jul 2010

See all articles by Peter T. Leeson

Peter T. Leeson

George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

David Skarbek

Brown University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 18, 2009

Abstract

Why do criminals use constitutions? This paper argues that constitutions perform three critical functions in criminal organizations. First, criminal constitutions promote consensus by creating common knowledge among criminals about what the organization expects of them and what they can expect of the organization’s other members. Second, criminal constitutions regulate behaviors that are privately beneficially to individual criminals but costly to their organization as a whole. Third, criminal constitutions generate information about member misconduct and coordinate the enforcement of rules that prohibit such behavior. By performing these functions, constitutions facilitate criminal cooperation and enhance criminals’ profit. To examine our hypothesis we examine the constitutions of two criminal organizations: 18th-century Caribbean pirates and the contemporary Californian prison gang, La Nuestra Familia.

Suggested Citation

Leeson, Peter T. and Skarbek, David, Criminal Constitutions (August 18, 2009). Global Crime, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 279-298, 2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1457515

Peter T. Leeson (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.peterleeson.com

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
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HOME PAGE: http://ppe.mercatus.org/scholars/peter-leeson

David Skarbek

Brown University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 1844
Providence, RI 02912
United States

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