Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic Espionage

71 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2009 Last revised: 28 Oct 2009

See all articles by Aaron J. Burstein

Aaron J. Burstein

University of California, Berkeley - School of Information; University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Date Written: August 26, 2009

Abstract

Since its inception, the Economic Espionage Act has been touted as a way to advance U.S. national security interests. Specifically, proponents in Congress and law enforcement and intelligence officials since then have argued that economic espionage harms national security by undermining U.S. competitiveness and technological advantage. The domains of national security and trade secrecy, however, have conflicting and irreconcilable structures for protecting information. The notion that United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies can effectively address economic espionage without altering the basic contours of trade secret protection is misguided. These agencies rarely have access to firm-level information about threats to economically valuable information, but the firms that own trade secrets lack the perspective that might allow them to identify and defend against state-sponsored threats. Using diplomatic means to gain a better understanding of how other nations fund scientific and technical research development offers a more promising means of reducing the incentives and cover for economic espionage than does the current strategy of attempting to make incompatible legal paradigms work together.

Keywords: Intellectual property, trade secrets, economic espionage, national security

Suggested Citation

Burstein, Aaron J., Trade Secrecy as an Instrument of National Security? Rethinking the Foundations of Economic Espionage (August 26, 2009). Arizona State Law Journal, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1462319

Aaron J. Burstein (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - School of Information ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
266
Abstract Views
1,019
Rank
209,128
PlumX Metrics