Piracy on the Internet: Accomodate it or Fight it? A Dynamic Approach

26 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2009

See all articles by Ronald Peeters

Ronald Peeters

University of Otago

Michael Yang

affiliation not provided to SSRN

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Tilburg University

Date Written: September 7, 2009

Abstract

This paper uses a dynamic stochastic model to solve for the optimal pricing policy of the music recording companies in the presence of P2P file-sharing networks eroding their CD sales. We employ a policy iteration algorithm on a discretized state space to numerically compute the optimal price policy. The realistically calibrated model reflects the real-world figures we observe and provides estimates of figures we can not observe, such as changes in total welfare. The results suggest that, thanks to the existence of P2P networks, total welfare in 2008 in the U.S. is about $25.6 billion more per annum than in 1999 before P2P was introduced. Moreover, the results predict that the current trend of decreasing CD sales will continue until around the year 2020 when it will stabilize at around 231.2 million copies per year, comparing to the industry all-time high of 938.9 million in 1999. The comparative static analysis shows that full enforcement of intellectual property rights, although helpful for the industrial profit, may have adverse effect on total welfare.

Keywords: dynamic price competition, music industry, piracy, P2P networks

JEL Classification: L11, L82, L86

Suggested Citation

Peeters, Ronald and Yang, Michael and Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, Piracy on the Internet: Accomodate it or Fight it? A Dynamic Approach (September 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1469564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1469564

Ronald Peeters

University of Otago ( email )

Department of Economics
P.O. Box 56
Dunedin, Otago 9054
New Zealand

Michael Yang

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

P. Jean-Jacques Herings (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

Department of Econometrics and Operations Research
P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4668797 (Phone)
5000 LE (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/jean-jacques-herings/home

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