Royal Dutch/Shell: A Shell Game with Oil Reserves (A) Case Number: CG-17A Publication Year: 2009

Posted: 30 Sep 2009

See all articles by David F. Larcker

David F. Larcker

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Hoover Institution; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Robert Lawson

Independent

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Date Written: August 14, 2009

Abstract

In January 2004, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies announced that it would reduce its estimate of proved oil reserves by nearly 4 billion barrels, or 20 percent. The announcement set off a series of events, including a drop in the company’s share price, internal and external investigations, and the resignation of several senior officers. During this period, details came to light about the sometimes bitter disputes among company officials over its reserve practices. Company officials had to decide what changes to make to restore public confidence in the organization.

Keywords: Accounting, Board of Directors, Corporate Governance, management controls

Suggested Citation

Larcker, David F. and Lawson, Robert and Tayan, Brian, Royal Dutch/Shell: A Shell Game with Oil Reserves (A) Case Number: CG-17A Publication Year: 2009 (August 14, 2009). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Teaching Case No. CG -17 (A), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1480285

David F. Larcker (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

Graduate School of Business
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
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650-725-6159 (Phone)

Stanford University - Hoover Institution ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Robert Lawson

Independent

Brian Tayan

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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