The Effects of Management and Provision Accounts on Hedge Fund Returns

50 Pages Posted: 12 Oct 2009

See all articles by Serge Darolles

Serge Darolles

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG

Christian Gourieroux

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO); Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique (ENSAE); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: October 8, 2009

Abstract

A characteristic of hedge funds is not only an active portfolio management, but also the allocation of portfolio performance between different accounts, which are the accounts for the external investors, an account for the management firm and a provision account. Despite a lack of transparency in hedge fund market, the strategy of performance allocation is publicly available. This paper shows that these complex performance allocation strategies might explain stylized facts observed in hedge fund returns, such as return persistence, skewed return distribution, bias ratio, or implied increasing risk appetite.

Keywords: Hedge Fund, Sharpe Performance, Persistence of Returns, Bias Ratio, Manager Incentive, Risk Appetite, High Water Mark, Management Account

JEL Classification: G11

Suggested Citation

Darolles, Serge and Gourieroux, Christian, The Effects of Management and Provision Accounts on Hedge Fund Returns (October 8, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1485289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1485289

Serge Darolles (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine - DRM-CEREG ( email )

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Christian Gourieroux

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

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Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) ( email )

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Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique (ENSAE) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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