The Rationale of Rationality

Rationality and Society, Vol. 21, pp. 249-277

Posted: 23 Oct 2009

See all articles by Jeroen Weesie

Jeroen Weesie

Department of Sociology / ICS, Utrecht University

Chris Snijders

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Vincent Buskens

Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR); Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS

Date Written: April 17, 2009

Abstract

Our research starts from the assumption that actors use a single decision theory to guide them on how to behave in all possible one-shot two-person encounters. To address which decision theories perform well, we let 17 theories compete in a large number of randomly selected symmetric 2×2 games. It turns out that the decision theory that optimizes its own payoff under the assumption that the other actor behaves randomly wins by a small margin. Second, we study the ‘evolution of rationality.’ In a quasi-biological setup where more successful strategies generate more offspring, the decision theory that always plays the behavior that belongs to the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium emerges as the long-term survivor from an initially mixed pool of decision theories. We also confront the decision theories with human experimental data. The decision theory that always aims for the highest possible payoff for itself performs best against humans.

Keywords: decision theories, evolution, one-shot encounters

Suggested Citation

Weesie, Jeroen and Snijders, Chris and Buskens, Vincent and Buskens, Vincent, The Rationale of Rationality (April 17, 2009). Rationality and Society, Vol. 21, pp. 249-277, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492635

Jeroen Weesie

Department of Sociology / ICS, Utrecht University ( email )

Heidelberglaan 2
Utrecht, 3584 CS
United States

Chris Snijders

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Vincent Buskens (Contact Author)

Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) ( email )

Rotterdam
Netherlands

Utrecht University - Department of Sociology/ICS ( email )

Heidelberglaan 2
Utrecht, 3584 CS
Netherlands

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