Associate Attrition and the Tragedy of the Commons
The CRIT, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 48-95, Spring 2008
48 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2009
Date Written: January 1, 2008
Abstract
Empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that associate attrition is a significant and increasing problem for large law firms. My Article examines how incentive structures at law firms affect associate retention rates. My central thesis that partners’ use of associate labor resembles a classic “tragedy of the commons” in which associates are overworked and undervalued. The overexploitation of associate labor dampens morale among associates and leads to inefficiently high levels of associate attrition. Law firms can resolve this problem by forcing partners to “internalize” the attrition costs that their exploitative activities impose on the firm.
Keywords: Associate attrition, tragedy of the commons, law firm
JEL Classification: K00
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation