Associate Attrition and the Tragedy of the Commons

The CRIT, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 48-95, Spring 2008

48 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2009

Date Written: January 1, 2008

Abstract

Empirical studies and anecdotal evidence suggest that associate attrition is a significant and increasing problem for large law firms. My Article examines how incentive structures at law firms affect associate retention rates. My central thesis that partners’ use of associate labor resembles a classic “tragedy of the commons” in which associates are overworked and undervalued. The overexploitation of associate labor dampens morale among associates and leads to inefficiently high levels of associate attrition. Law firms can resolve this problem by forcing partners to “internalize” the attrition costs that their exploitative activities impose on the firm.

Keywords: Associate attrition, tragedy of the commons, law firm

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Joshua S., Associate Attrition and the Tragedy of the Commons (January 1, 2008). The CRIT, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 48-95, Spring 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1492971 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1492971

Joshua S. Johnson (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

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