Coalition Formation in Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach

International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 303-317, 2008

Posted: 30 Oct 2009

Date Written: September 2008

Abstract

In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric players and the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. It is shown that the game is characterized by positive externalities - the merger of coalitions increases the payoffs of players who belong to other coalitions. A key result is that, apart from the case of two players, the grand coalition is not a Nash equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, in the case of three or more players the only Nash equilibrium coalition structure is the one formed by singletons. The results indicate that the prospects of cooperation in straddling stock fisheries are low if players can free ride cooperative agreements. Thus, in order to protect cooperation, under the aegis of regional fishery management organizations, unregulated fishing must be prevented.

Keywords: Coalition, partition function, externalities, bioeconomic model, straddling fish stock

JEL Classification: C72, Q22

Suggested Citation

Pintassilgo, Pedro and Lindroos, Marko, Coalition Formation in Straddling Stock Fisheries: A Partition Function Approach (September 2008). International Game Theory Review, Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp. 303-317, 2008 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1496151

Pedro Pintassilgo (Contact Author)

University of Algarve ( email )

8000-117 Faro
Portugal

Marko Lindroos

University of Helsinki ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
458
PlumX Metrics