How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?
WZB Working Paper No. SP II 2009-13
15 Pages Posted: 19 Dec 2009
Date Written: November 3, 2009
Abstract
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Keywords: antitrust, deterrence, merger policy
JEL Classification: L40, L49, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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