Entrepreneurial Alliances as Contractual Forms
Posted: 9 Nov 2009
Date Written: 2006
Abstract
Presents an empirical analysis of the contractualdesign of entrepreneurial alliances or collaborative agreements entered into byentrepreneurial firms. First, a series of arguments based on transaction costtheory is used to generate a number of hypotheses regarding the determinants ofthe contractual complexity of collaborative agreements. Taken together, these hypotheses predict that the contractual complexity ofan entrepreneurial alliance will be negatively related to relational capitaland positively related to asset specificity, the costs of searching for apartner, and the strategic importance of the alliance. Data from a survey of 66entrepreneurial firms in the German telecommunications industry are used totest the hypotheses. Analysis of the data reveals that entrepreneurial firms tend to design morecomplex contracts when the costs of searching for a partner are higher and thestrategic importance of the alliance greater. In other words, only two of thehypotheses are viable. These results underscore the fact that governancestructures and contractual forms have different antecedents for entrepreneurialfirms. (SAA)
Keywords: Transaction costs, Telecommunications industry, Contracts & agreements, Interfirm alliances, Cooperation, Assets, Strategic alliances
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