Does Scarcity Exacerbate the Tragedy of the Commons? Evidence from Fishers' Experimental Responses

36 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2009

See all articles by Jorge H Maldonado

Jorge H Maldonado

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics; LACEEP

Rocio del Pilar Moreno Sánchez

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

Date Written: October 1, 2009

Abstract

Economic Experimental Games (EEGs), focused to analyze dilemmas associated with the use of common pool resources, have shown that individuals make extraction decisions that deviate from the suboptimal Nash equilibrium. However, few studies have analyzed whether these deviations towards the social optimum are affected as the stock of resource changes. Performing EEG with local fishermen, we test the hypothesis that the behavior of participants differs under a situation of abundance versus one of scarcity. Our findings show that under a situation of scarcity, players over-extract a given resource, and thus make decisions above the Nash equilibrium; in doing so, they obtain less profit, mine the others-regarding interest, and exacerbate the tragedy of the commons. This result challenges previous findings from the EEG literature. When individuals face abundance of a given resource, however, they deviate downward from the prediction of individualistic behavior. The phenomenon of private, inefficient overexploitation is corrected when management strategies are introduced into the game, something that underlines the importance of institutions.

Keywords: tragedy of the commons intensified, economic experimental games

JEL Classification: D01, D02, D03, O13, O54, Q01, Q22, C93, C72, C73, C23

Suggested Citation

Maldonado, Jorge H and Moreno Sánchez, Rocio del Pilar, Does Scarcity Exacerbate the Tragedy of the Commons? Evidence from Fishers' Experimental Responses (October 1, 2009). Documento CEDE No. 2009-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1502899 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1502899

Jorge H Maldonado (Contact Author)

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

LACEEP ( email )

CATIE
Turrialba
Costa Rica

Rocio del Pilar Moreno Sánchez

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia ( email )

Carrera Primera # 18A-12
Bogota, DC D.C. 110311
Colombia

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
159
Abstract Views
1,529
Rank
336,214
PlumX Metrics