The State of Corporate Governance Research

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23. No. 3, pp. 939-961, 2010.

Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-20

Charles A. Dice WP 2009-21

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 652

39 Pages Posted: 21 Nov 2009 Last revised: 27 Sep 2010

See all articles by Lucian A. Bebchuk

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael S. Weisbach

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 17, 2009

Abstract

This paper, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance co-sponsored by the Review of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue feature seven papers on corporate governance that were presented in a meeting of the NBER‘s corporate governance project. Each of the papers represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research. For each of these areas, we discuss the importance of the area and the questions it focuses on, how the paper in the special issue makes a significant contribution to this area, and what we do and do not know about the area. We discuss in turn work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders, comparative corporate governance, cross-border investments in global capital markets, and the political economy of corporate governance.

Keywords: corporate governance, investor protection, shareholders, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Weisbach, Michael S., The State of Corporate Governance Research (November 17, 2009). Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23. No. 3, pp. 939-961, 2010., Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2009-03-20 , Charles A. Dice WP 2009-21, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 652, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1508146 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1508146

Lucian A. Bebchuk

Harvard Law School ( email )

Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-812-0554 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Michael S. Weisbach (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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