Hybrid Political Institutions and Governability: The Budgetary Process in Brazil

Abstract

In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential countries, the President possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto), which allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments. Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the President can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) depends on the kind of amendment to the budget introduced by legislators. One kind, indi-vidual amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.

Keywords: Brazil, consensual and majoritarian institutions, amendments to the budget, executive-legislative relations, budgetary decision-making

JEL Classification: P16