The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
Posted: 1 Dec 2009
There are 4 versions of this paper
The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis
Date Written: 2005
Abstract
Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) have gained increasingly important roles in determining and maintaining technological standards over the last twenty years. The relationship between the characteristics of SSOs and the rules that they enforce to license and disclose intellectual property are examined. First, two theories from Lerner-Triole (2004) are tested: (1) there is a negative correlation between the concession level of technology sponsors and the extent of the orientation of an SSO to them, and (2) the sponsor-friendliness of an SSO is positively related to the quality of a standard. It is hypothesized that a higher licensing price is associated with more disclosure within equilibrium, and settings with limited numbers of SSOs allow them to have greater control over technology sponsors. A database of 60 groups was established in 2003. Data were gathered from websites of SSOs, records of standards bodies, and information from surveys and interviews. Statistical analysis of the data revealed that the findings were consistent with both the propositions in this investigation and in Lerner-Triole (2004). Disclosure requirements are negatively related to policies requiring royalty-free licensing, whereas a positive relationship is found with policies with more reasonable licensing terms. Also, the connection between concessions and user-friendliness is not valid when only small numbers of SSOs are present. (SRY)
Keywords: Experimental/primary research, Invention disclosures, Intellectual property, Patents, Production standards, License agreements, Licensing strategies
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