L.A.'s Crown Jewels: Historical Governance and Finance Lessons

72 Pages Posted: 3 Dec 2009

See all articles by Steve Erie

Steve Erie

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Scott A. MacKenzie

University of California, Davis

Date Written: May 1, 2009

Abstract

In contrast to academic debates over metropolitan coordination, which draw a sharp distinction between government and governance, we describe a third approach whereby existing regional and local public bureaucracies coordinate rule-making and policy implementation by functionally-specific local agencies. In particular, we consider the historical performance of two region-wide vehicles set up to promote cooperation across local jurisdictions - the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and Southern California Regional Airport Authority - in promoting regional cooperation, responding to contemporary challenges, and balancing the benefits and burdens of growth. The experiences of these agencies show the benefits of proper institutional design. Carefully designed power-sharing arrangements enhance policy effectiveness and legitimacy without unduly compromising local sovereignty. Arrangements that fail to specify the responsibilities of members, impose super-majority voting rules, or subject agency decision making to the whims of term limited elected officials often prevent public bureaucracies from carrying out their core mission.

Keywords: California politics, bureaucracy and public administration, economic

JEL Classification: H7, R5

Suggested Citation

Erie, Steven Philip and MacKenzie, Scott A., L.A.'s Crown Jewels: Historical Governance and Finance Lessons (May 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1516718 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1516718

Steven Philip Erie (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Scott A. MacKenzie

University of California, Davis ( email )

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States

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