Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability

36 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2009

See all articles by Tiberiu Dragu

Tiberiu Dragu

New York University

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: December 2009

Abstract

How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democracy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal antiterrorism activity is desirable for the government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional constraints such as an effective judicial review on government’s antiterrorism actions.

Keywords: terrorism, elections, accountability

JEL Classification: D70

Suggested Citation

Dragu, Tiberiu and Polborn, Mattias K., Terrorism Prevention and Electoral Accountability (December 2009). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2864, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1519806 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1519806

Tiberiu Dragu

New York University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://wp.nyu.edu/tiberiu_dragu/

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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