Corporate Ownership and the Value of a Vote in an Emerging Market

Posted: 12 Dec 2009

See all articles by Kee H. Chung

Kee H. Chung

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management

Jeong-Kuk Kim

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: 1999

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.

Keywords: Voting right, Shapley value, Oceanic game, Ownership structure

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Chung, Kee H. and Kim, Jeong-Kuk, Corporate Ownership and the Value of a Vote in an Emerging Market (1999). Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1999, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1521501

Kee H. Chung (Contact Author)

State University of New York at Buffalo - School of Management ( email )

Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
716-645-3262 (Phone)
716-645-3823 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mgt.buffalo.edu/faculty/academic-departments/finance/faculty/kee-chung.html

Jeong-Kuk Kim

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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