Low Skilled Immigration and the Expansion of Private Schools

69 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2009

See all articles by Davide Dottori

Davide Dottori

Bank of Italy

I-Ling Shen

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Date Written: October 15, 2009

Abstract

A political-economic model is provided to study the impact of low-skilled immigration on the receiving country's education system, in terms of sources of school funding, expenditure per pupil, and type of parents who are more likely to send children to privately funded schools. The education regime results from the interplay between households' choices on fertility and education and the public education provided. No exogenous culturally-based difference is assumed among agents. Low-skilled migrant workers differ from their local counterparts only in voting rights and adjustment costs. The impact of immigration on public school congestion, tax base, wages and skill premium are considered. When the number of low-skilled immigrants is large, the education regime tends to become more segregated, with wealthier locals more likely to opt out of the public system into private schools. The fertility differential between high- and low-skilled locals increases due to a quantity/quality trade-off. The theoretical predictions conform to stylized facts revealed in US census data and OECD PISA (2003).

Keywords: double taxation, education funding, fertility, migration, segregation, voting

JEL Classification: H42, H52, I21, D72, O15

Suggested Citation

Dottori, Davide and Shen, I-Ling, Low Skilled Immigration and the Expansion of Private Schools (October 15, 2009). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No. 726, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1523639 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1523639

Davide Dottori (Contact Author)

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
Rome, 00184
Italy

I-Ling Shen

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) ( email )

Place Montesquieu, 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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