Empirical Uncertainty and Legal Decision-Making

MAN, LAW AND MODERN FORMS OF LIFE, Eugenio Bulygin, Jean Louis Gardies, Ilkka Nilniluoto, eds., with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles, volume 1, Law and Philosophy Library, D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 251-261, 1985.

Posted: 18 Dec 2009 Last revised: 20 Mar 2014

Date Written: June 1, 1983

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result.

Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate.

Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance.

Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims.

Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power.

Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis.

Available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook.

Keywords: legal decision-making, empirical uncertainty, precautionary principle, policy-making, knowledge, societal preference, norms

JEL Classification: K10

Suggested Citation

Vandervort, Lucinda, Empirical Uncertainty and Legal Decision-Making (June 1, 1983). MAN, LAW AND MODERN FORMS OF LIFE, Eugenio Bulygin, Jean Louis Gardies, Ilkka Nilniluoto, eds., with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles, volume 1, Law and Philosophy Library, D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 251-261, 1985., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1523919

Lucinda Vandervort (Contact Author)

University of Saskatchewan ( email )

Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A6
Canada
(306) 966-5889 (Phone)
(306) 966-5900 (Fax)

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