Proving a Negative: Rousseau and Madison’s Fear of Factionalism as Interpreted by Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty

24 Pages Posted: 17 Dec 2009

Date Written: December 16, 2009

Abstract

Often, the discussion that is first and foremost in the classical liberal tradition is the tension between the protection of the individual from the state and the protection of the state from individualism. Given this tension, this paper examines both Rousseau’s and Madison’s fear of factionalism as a potentially destructive social force and seeks to demonstrate that although both Rousseau and Madison come, seemingly, to the same conclusion on factionalism, each starts from a different concept of liberty and ultimately diverge on why factionalism is destructive. This divergence can be explicated in light of Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative and positive liberty and the ultimate goal of state formation in both the American and French traditions. This early protection from factionalism has led to very different democracies that endeavor to protect and promote different conceptions of the intended ends of society. In the modern political landscape each have ultimately encountered their own set of endemic problems from populist and radically self-interested forces. The idea that the United States was founded on a strong affirmation of negative liberty has often been discussed by authors such as Charles Taylor (1991), David Abraham (1996), and Micheal Walzer (1998). As will be discussed further, in The Federalist Papers 10, Madison outlines the fear that social forces left unchecked, can lead to a form of factionalism with the potential to subvert property rights and to impose religious ideology on the citizens of the United States. The Federalist Papers 10 thus advocates for a republican form of government to “cool the passions” of those who would infringe upon the rights of the individual. Republicanism, for Madison, creates a buffer between those who in a direct democracy may make poor decisions, and the educated elite who understand the true interests of the citizen and the nation. On the other end of the spectrum Rousseau who also fears factionalism, advocates for a direct democracy that would lead to the discernment of the general will of the people and thus the true good that would be in the interest of the society as a whole. This advocacy of what is good for society based on some notion of reason that is not just instrumental, leads to a collectivism that is best defined as positive liberty. Rousseau’s fear of factions is based on a refutation of egoist self-interest while Madison’s protests rest on a fear of collectivist social forces. Both authors come to the same conclusion on creating a buffer or an impediment in democratic societies that would prevent the individualizing or communalizing forces of society from changing the basic structure each author prescribes. Far from being decided, this debate between self-interest, factionalism, negative and positive liberty, the social good and the individual still lingers on across the world.

Keywords: Federalism, Madison, Federalist Papers, Representative Democracy, Rousseau, General Will, Social Contract, Property, Negative Liberty, Positive Liberty, Two Concepts of Liberty, Isaiah Berlin, republicanism, inequality, direct democracy, factionalism, factions, populism, pluralism, Bill of Rights

Suggested Citation

Easton, Whitney E., Proving a Negative: Rousseau and Madison’s Fear of Factionalism as Interpreted by Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (December 16, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1524157 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1524157

Whitney E. Easton (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut ( email )

Storrs, CT 06269-1063
United States

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