Corporate Governance in China and Hong Kong: Reconciling Traditional Chinese Values, Regulatory Innovation and Accountability

33 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2010

See all articles by Angus Young

Angus Young

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law; German-Sino Institute of Legal Studies, Nanjing Univeristy; Hong Kong Baptist University

Date Written: January 9, 2010

Abstract

Much has been said about the convergence of corporate governance and regulations. The underlying assumptions of this phenomenon are driven by globalisation and the dominance of the Anglo-US model of corporate governance. Since the Asian crisis in 1997, Hong Kong and perhaps to a less extend China, had amended both company laws and regulations, mirroring provisions and rules in developed Western economics. This paper will attempt to reconcile the east-west ideological divide about regulating corporate governance under a meta-regulatory framework. The aim is to combine laws and ethics thereby enhancing accountability and improving regulatory compliance by adapting Chinese ethical values like Confucianism into the regulatory system. Therefore, the overarching goal of this exercise is to adapt the wisdom of Chinese ethics into regulatory guidelines for Hong Kong and China’s rapidly growing economies.

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Regulation, Directors, Ethics

JEL Classification: G30, G38, K22, L50, N45

Suggested Citation

Young, Angus, Corporate Governance in China and Hong Kong: Reconciling Traditional Chinese Values, Regulatory Innovation and Accountability (January 9, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1533904 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1533904

Angus Young (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Law ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
China

German-Sino Institute of Legal Studies, Nanjing Univeristy ( email )

22 Hankou Road
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210093
China

Hong Kong Baptist University ( email )

Renfrew Road 34
Kowloon Tong
Hong Kong

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
465
Abstract Views
2,253
Rank
113,435
PlumX Metrics