Error and Design: Economics in (and Some Economics of) the Australian Competition Tribunal

21 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2010

Date Written: January 14, 2010

Abstract

The Australian Competition Tribunal plays a central role in the Australian regulatory system. Three of the Tribunal’s recent decisions are examined and found to have significant errors. It is argued on the basis of the economics of the institutional design that these errors are inevitable in a system where regulatory decisions are based on vague standards. It is concluded that the quality of regulation would be improved by a shift to a regulatory system that relied less on such vague standards and more on prescriptive, explicit rules.

Keywords: competition, Australia, tribunal, economics, regulation

Suggested Citation

Ergas, Henry, Error and Design: Economics in (and Some Economics of) the Australian Competition Tribunal (January 14, 2010). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1536739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1536739

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