Why Does the WTO Have an Antidumping Agreement?

LICOS Discussion Paper No. 253/2010

37 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2010

See all articles by James C. Hartigan

James C. Hartigan

University of Oklahoma

Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR

Date Written: March 2009

Abstract

This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongstWTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner's dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.

Suggested Citation

Hartigan, James C. and Vandenbussche, Hylke, Why Does the WTO Have an Antidumping Agreement? (March 2009). LICOS Discussion Paper No. 253/2010, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1538757 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1538757

James C. Hartigan (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma ( email )

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Hylke Vandenbussche

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), CEPR ( email )

Faculty of Economics
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Belgium
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