Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Date Written: 1998
Abstract
This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is found that if behaviour is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases.
Keywords: Evolution, Long run equilibria, Mutation rates, Ergodic, Population size
JEL Classification: C70, D80, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Robles, Jack, Evolution with Changing Mutation Rates (1998). Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 79, 1998, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542935
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