Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Date Written: 1997
Abstract
This note applies the evolutionary dynamic of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-65) to class coordination games that the entire population plays simultaneously. In these games, payoffs and best replies are determined by a symmary statistic of the population strategy profile as in Crawford ( Econometrica 63 (1995), 103-144). A simple characterization of the set of Long Run Equilibria, analogous to the one given by Kandori, Mailath, and Rob for random pairing, is provided.
Keywords: Evolution, Dynamic, Class coordination games, Population, Strategy profile, Long run equilibria
JEL Classification: C70, C71, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Robles, Jack, Evolution and Long Run Equilibria in Coordination Games with Summary Statistic Payoff Technologies (1997). Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 75, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1542936
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