Overdraft Regulation: Is There a Silver Lining for Credit Unions?

Filene Research Institute Research Brief No. 211

Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-15

36 Pages Posted: 17 Jul 2010

See all articles by Adam J. Levitin

Adam J. Levitin

Georgetown University Law Center

Date Written: July 15, 2010

Abstract

This research brief examines the potential impact of overdraft regulation on credit unions using a unique data set developed from a survey of 185 credit unions' overdraft practices. It provides the first-ever empirical overview of credit unions' overdraft practices, as well as data on credit union products that compete with overdraft: credit card and payday loans. The study finds that in the unlikely worst-case scenario under the Reg E revisions, in which no credit union members opt-in for overdraft services, total average fee income could sink as much as 11% and that overall ROA could fall by as much as 9 basis points. A smaller impact is more plausible, however, given that credit unions will control the overdraft opt-in solicitation process and that repeat overdrafters -- the source of the majority of overdraft fees -- often value the service and would likely opt-in. The study concludes by suggesting that credit unions see repeat overdrafting as presenting an opportunity to serve members with affordable, short-term loans coupled with financial counseling -- a return to employer-based credit unions' roots as the original (and affordable) payday lenders. Offering affordable credit coupled with financial counseling has proven a successful product for the credit unions that have attempted it and presents a major opportunity to profitably build member loyalty.

Keywords: credit union, overdraft, payday, credit cards, Reg E

Suggested Citation

Levitin, Adam J., Overdraft Regulation: Is There a Silver Lining for Credit Unions? (July 15, 2010). Filene Research Institute Research Brief No. 211 , Georgetown Law and Economics Research Paper No. 10-15, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1544888

Adam J. Levitin (Contact Author)

Georgetown University Law Center ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
113
Abstract Views
1,445
Rank
442,360
PlumX Metrics